Post-quantum cryptography moved from research topic to operational requirement between 2024 and 2026. NIST finalized its first three PQC standards in August 2024, regulators have attached real deadlines to migration, and data being harvested today can be decrypted retroactively once a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer exists. Yet most organizations remain in the earliest stages of migration: aware of the mandate, uncertain of their own cryptographic footprint, and without a working plan to change it.
Inventory, not algorithm selection, is the bottleneck
Awareness is high and execution is not. Most organizations can name a driver for PQC migration; far fewer can say where quantum-vulnerable cryptography is actually in use across their estate, what it protects, and how long that data must stay confidential. A continuously-updated Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) turns that uncertainty into a prioritizable list.
- Discover — build and maintain the cryptographic inventory, including vendor and third-party dependencies
- Assess — classify findings by confidentiality lifetime, regulatory exposure, criticality, and remediation effort
- Remediate — migrate in priority order, using hybrid schemes to avoid an all-or-nothing cutover
- Govern — stop new quantum-vulnerable cryptography entering the estate during the transition
- Monitor — treat the CBOM as living infrastructure as standards and deadlines evolve
What the paper covers
The full whitepaper sets out the NIST standards and their 2026 status, the regulatory and sector drivers from CNSA 2.0 to the EU roadmap, the common pitfalls that stall migrations, and concrete recommendations for 2026–2027. Download the PDF for the complete analysis.